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COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE OPERATING &
TREATMENT ROOM:
HOW TO NAVIGATE THE EVER-EXPANDING THEORIES OF
LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL DEVICE & PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES.
Michael J. Summerhill* & Aaron M, Chandler**

INTRODUCTION
Modem surgeries invariably involve personnel above and beyond the
surgeon, nurses and anesthesiologists. Frequently, representatives of
pharmaceutical companies, surgical instrument companies and medical
device companies attend surgeries to observe the use of the company's
products or calibrate the product for use by the surgeon 1 . For some
products, the company representative is a necessary part of the surgery
without which the surgery could not proceed.2 As a result of this now
common practice, medical device and pharmaceutical companies can
be subject to many more theories of liability besides the traditional
product-specific theories of product liability (whether strict product
liability or negligence). Indeed, following the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Riegel v. Medtronic3 that further limited the productspecific claims available to plaintiffs lawyers, the creative plaintiffs
bar can be expected to advance these theories with greater regularity as
these companies remain attractive deep-pocket defendants.
*Michael Summerhill is a partner in the Chicago office of SmithAmundsen LLC. Mr.
Summerhill dedicates a significant portion of his practice to the defense of medical
device
pharmaceutical
companies.
**Aaronand
Chandler
is an associate
in the Chicago office of Katten Muchin Rosenman
LLP.
NAESPE (n/k/a/ Heart Rhythm Society) Policy Statement, The Role(s) of the
Industry Employed Allied Professional (March 2001), available at http!L/
www.hrsonline.orgz/Policy/ClinicalGuidelines/upload/Role%20ofo/
20Industrv/2020
01.pdf (recognizing the increasing importance of company representatives during
implant surgeries).
2 See, e.g., John J. Hayes, The Role of Industry in the Implantation and Follow-up of
Devices: A Practitioner'sPerspective, 7 Cardiac Electrophysiology Rev. 5, 58 (2003)
(noting that physicians cannot be expected to be familiar with the myriad of devices
on the market and that as a result, physicians depend on having personnel who are
knowledgeable about the device present during implant surgeries).
3 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). In Riegel, the Supreme Court held that the pre-emption
clause contained in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act bars state common-law claims challenging the safety or
effectiveness of a medical device given pre-market approval by the FDA.
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This article will discuss the various theories under which a
medical device or pharmaceutical company may incur liability due to a
representative's presence in the operating/treatment room, and suggest
the best practices to position that company for an effective defense.
The theories of liability can generally be placed into two main
categories: (1) claims alleging liability based on the representative's
mere presence in the operating/treatment room; and (2) claims alleging
liability based on the actions or omissions of the company
representative. While the case law addressing these theories is not yet
well-developed, thereby giving the plaintiffs bar ample room within
which to maneuver specific fact patterns, there is substantial and welldeveloped case law giving medical device and pharmaceutical
companies numerous defenses. These defenses sound in (1) the learned
intermediary doctrine; (2) the informed consent doctrine; (3) the strong
public policy in favor of the doctor-patient relationship and prohibiting
any interference in that relationship; (4) the prohibition on the
unlicensed practice of medicine; and, at least with respect to medical
devices, (5) the federal practice of medical doctrine as set forth in the
Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act.
I.

PRIVACY
IMPLICATIONS ARISING
FROM
REPRESENTATIVE IN THE TREATMENT ROOM.

A

Medical device and pharmaceutical companies should first
recognize that liability can, under certain circumstances, be imposed
merely because of the representative's presence at the time of
treatment. While such liability can generally be avoided altogether
with an appropriate patient consent, it is important to understand under
what circumstances a consent is either advisable or required. As an
initial matter, local law should always be consulted to determine if
there are any state statutes or regulations prohibiting a representative's
presence. Even if the local law is silent, the company representative
should be familiar with the policies of the hospital or clinic at which the
treatment will occur. For example, both the American College of
Surgeons and the Association of peri-Operative Registered Nurses
("AORN") have issued statements outlining policies regarding the4
presence of health care industry representatives in the operating room.
4 American

College of Surgeons, Statement on Health Care Industry Representatives
in the OperatingRoom, availableat
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The American College of Surgeons requires that "[t]he patient should
be informed of the presence and purpose of the [health care industry
representative] in the [operating room] and give written, informed5
consent. This should be documented within the medical records."
Absent a valid consent, patients have sought to impose liability on
medical device and pharmaceutical companies based on the
representative's presence under an invasion of privacy theory.
A.

Invasion of Privacy

The first reported decision to impose liability because of the
presence of a third-party during treatment is the Michigan Supreme
Court's decision in De May v. Roberts.6 While De May did not involve
either a medical device or pharmaceutical company representative, it
serves as the basis for an invasion of privacy claim against third-parties
who are present during medical treatment. In De May, the physician
made a house call to assist in the birth of a child and brought with him
a "young unmarried man" who was "utterly ignorant of the practice of
medicine.", 7 The doctor explained to the patient and the patient's
husband that the man was there "to help carry [the doctor's] things." 8
Neither the patient nor the husband objected to the man's presence. In
upholding liability against the "young unmarried man" for invasion of
privacy, the court stressed that the plaintiff had a legal right to privacy
during such a "sacred" occasion and "[t]he fact that at the time, she
consented to the presence of [the layman] supposing him to be a
physician, [did] not preclude her from maintaining an action and
recovering substantial damages upon afterwards ascertaining his true
character." 9 The court reasoned that the plaintiff and her husband
could reasonably presume that the layman "was an assistant physician,
a competent and proper person to be present,"1 0 and that a clear and
http://www.aom.org/PracticeResources/AORNPositionStatements/Position

HealthCa

reRepresentative/; Association of periOperative Registered Nurses, AORN Statement
on the Role of the Health Care Industry Representative in the Operating Room,
available at http://www.aorn.org/about/positions/industryrep.htm.
5 American College of Surgeons, Statement on Health Care Industry Representatives
in the Operating Room, available at http://www.facs.org/fellowsinfo/statements/st33.html.
6 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
7

Id.at 146.
Id. at 147.
9
1d. at 149.
'0 Id. at 146.
8
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certain statement as to the layman status was required to put the
plaintiff and her husband on notice.' 1 The De May court's reasoning,
therefore, is consistent with the American College of Surgeon's stated
requirements, that the patient be informed of the true nature of the
company's representatives, i.e., who they are and why they are there.
The modem claim of invasion of privacy is set forth in Section
652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 12 and the California Court
of Appeals applied the Restatement formulation against a
pharmaceutical company in the 2001 case of Sanchez-Scott v. Alza
Pharmaceuticals.13 There, the plaintiff was a breast cancer patient who
brought suit after one of the defendant's sales representatives had been
present during her breast exam. At the time of the exam, the plaintiff's
physician explained that the sales representative was "a person ...who

was looking at [the physician's] work.' 14 The sales representative was
present pursuant to the defendant's "mentor[ing] program whereby its
representatives . . . were directed to participate in private medical

activities" of the defendant's physician-customers. 15
Relying on De May, the court concluded that a manufacturer
could be liable for invasion of privacy under the tort of intrusion. The
court stressed that the tort of intrusion requires an invasion by the
defendant into the plaintiffs vrivate affairs that a reasonable person
The court first determined that a
would find highly offensive.
medical examination is, as a matter of law, a private affair. ' 7 The court
then concluded that a reasonable person would find the sales
representative's presence during a breast exam to be highly offensive. 18
In so holding, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the
plaintiff had consented to the representative's presence when she did
not ask him to leave because the physician did not inform her that the
representative was an employee of the defendant rather than the

" Id.
at 147.

12

"One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or

seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B.
3 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d410 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).

1 Id. at 412-13.
iId.
at 412.
6
1 1d. at 415-16.
17Id. at

417 ("It cannot be easily disputed that medical examinations involve private
matters.").
'8Id.at 418-19.
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physician. 19 Thus, Sanchez-Scott, like De May, essentially turned on

the absence of fully informed consent.
B.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Some states, most notably New York, do not recognize a broad
cause of action for invasion of privacy. 20 Rather, the cause of action is
limited only to unwarranted publicity and the defamation of one's
personality and does not protect against the wrongful intrusion into
one's private activities. 2 1 Even if a cause of action for invasion of
privacy is unavailable, however, the cause of action for intentional
22
infliction of emotional distress may accomplish the same result.
For example, in New York, the cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress requires "(1) [an] extreme and
outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress, (3) a
causal connection between the conduct and the injury, and (4) severe
emotional distress., 2 3 The primary difference between invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress lies in the level
Whereas a
of offensiveness a plaintiff must prove to recover.
successful action for invasion of privacy requires conduct "highly
offensive to the reasonable person," to prevail on a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that the conduct
was "so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious
19 Id. at 419-20.

Moore v. Sam's Club, 55 F.Supp. 2d 177, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("New York does
not recognize a common law claim for invasion of privacy such as intrusion on
seclusion.").
21 62A Am Jur. 2d § 6 at 649-51.
In the past, federal courts in New York raised the
question of whether the New York State Court of Appeals might recognize such a
cause of action if confronted with the issue. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 588
F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[I]n light of the current jurisprudence, it is hard to
believe that the New York Court of Appeals today would ... bar an action based on
intrusion upon privacy."); Socialist Workers Party v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 642 F.
Supp. 1357, 1420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). More recent cases, however, suggest that
courts are no longer making that prediction: "New York's highest court has
consistently reminded litigants that no so-called common law right of privacy exists
in New York." Hurwitz v. United States, 884 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1989); see also
Menton v. Experian, No. 02 CIV. 4687(NRB), 2003 WL941388, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 6, 2003) ("[T]here exists serious question as to whether New York law
recognizes this tort.").
22 62A Am Jur. 2d § 6 at 650-51
23 Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1996).
20
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and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 24 While there are no
reported decisions addressing this cause of action in the context of a
claim against a medical device or pharmaceutical company arising out
of a representative's presence in the treatment room, the courts'
analyses in De May and Sanchez-Scott would indicate that such a cause
of action may very well lie in those states that do not recognize a cause
of action for invasion of privacy.
C.
Consent?

Who Should be Liable for a Lack of Informed

As the authority makes clear, if the patient is fully informed and
consents to the representative's presence, medical device and
pharmaceutical companies are well-positioned to defend any invasion
of privacy or intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.25 In
addition, in those situations where the company representative is a
necessary part of the treatment but the patient is not fully informed,
medical device and pharmaceutical companies would also have very
strong defenses to such claims - under an objective standard, a
reasonable patient would not object to the presence of somebody who
his or her doctor has determined is necessary for the treatment. Finally,
even in those situations where the representative's presence is either
not medically necessary or the patient is otherwise not fully informed,
medical device and pharmaceutical companies are not without viable
defenses. Indeed, strong arguments can be made that only the doctor
can convey information to a patient, and therefore, only a doctor can be
liable when a patient is not fully informed.
Well-established law, in virtually every jurisdiction, provides
that one of the primary duties arising from the doctor-patient
relationship is the doctor's affirmative duty to disclose facts related to
the patient's medical treatment. Under the doctrine of informed
consent, the doctor must disclose the risks of the surgery, foreseeable
results, reasonable alternatives, and any other information that a
reasonable physician would convey to a patient under similar

Doe v. Cmty. Health Plan, 268 A.D. 2d 183, 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
See, e.g., Sanchez-Scott, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418 ("The maxim of law that one who
consents to an act is not wronged by it applies to the tort of invasion of privacy" such
24
25

that "[i]f voluntary consent is present, a defendant's conduct will rarely be deemed
highly offensive to a reasonable person so as to justify tort liability.") (quotations and
citations omitted).
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circumstances. 26 The doctor's duty of disclosure is unique to doctors
and is governed by his/her medical judgment.27 As a result, the doctor,
need not, and invariably should not, disclose all risks and
consequences. Rather, the law requires a doctor to "exercise discretion
in prudently disclosing information in accordance with his patient's
In fact, courts recognize that there may be
best interests., 28
circumstances in which physicians, in the exercise of their discretion,
determine not to convey certain information to a patient:
As the expert testimony revealed in the present case,
excessive disclosure of remote risks would tend to do
more harm than good to the patient. A doctor has a
special relationship with his patient. This relationship
not only vests the doctor with the responsibility of
disclosure, but also requires the doctor to exercise
discretion in prudently disclosing information in
accordance with his patient's best interests. To disclose
more than that which is material would run counter to
assumed through the doctor-patient
the responsibility
29
relationship.

26

App. 3d 1029, 1040 (I1. App. Ct. 1984) ("We also
Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 111.

believe that the physician-patient relationship does create an affirmative duty to
disclose facts."); see also Hahn v. Mirda, 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 749 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) ("Under the doctrine of informed consent, a doctor does have a duty to disclose
to his patient all material information that is necessary to make an informed decision
about a proposed treatment."); State v. Presidential Women's Ctr., 937 So.2d 114,
116 (Fla. 2006) ("Under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician has an
obligation to advise his or her patient of the material risks of undergoing a medical
procedure."); American Med. Ass'n, Code of Medical Ethics § 8.08 (2004-2005 ed.)
("The patient's right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possess enough information to enable an intelligent choice."). In Texas, the duty of
disclosure has been codified. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 74.102-103
(Vernon Supp. 2008).
27 See, e.g., Buckner v. Allergan Pharm., Inc., 400 So.2d 820, 823 (Fla. Ct.
App.
1981) ("The extent of disclosure is a matter of medical judgment."); Hatfield v.
App. 3d 780, 788 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) ("It is the
Sandoz-Wander, Inc., 124 Ill.
doctor's decision as to which facts should be told to the patient, and the extent of
disclosure is a matter of medicaljudgment.") (emphasis added).
App. 3d 763, 768 (111. App. Ct. 1976) ("[A
28 See, e.g., Miceikis v. Field, 37 I11.
doctor's duty of disclosure] requires the doctor to exercise discretion in prudently
disclosing...").
29 Miceikis, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 768 (citations omitted)(emphasis added); Hatfield,
124
Ill. App. 3d at 788-89 (a physician may "indeed exercis[e] his judgment in
withholding certain information [from a patient]"); James M. Beck & Elizabeth D.
Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and
Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 101 (1998) (hereinafter "Off-Label Use")
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Because of the delicate considerations involved in a physician's
decision to disclose information, and because of the real danger that
others may convey information to the patient that the physician has
determined the patient should not be told, third-parties like medical
device and pharmaceutical companies have strong arguments that they
cannot have a duty to disclose. Illinois courts, for example, have
consistently held that even hospitals do not have a duty to specify what
information physicians convey to their patients because such a duty
would interfere in a physician's discretion and impinge on the
physician-patient relationship.3 ° If a hospital does not have a duty to
disclose facts or otherwise specify what facts a physician discloses to a
patient, medical device and pharmaceutical companies have strong
arguments that they cannot have such a duty either. Otherwise, the
medical device or pharmaceutical company runs the risk of infringing
on the doctor's discretion by conveying information to the patient that
the physician has determined the patient should not be told. Thus, even
if the patient is not fully informed of the specifics regarding a company
representative in the treating room, the company has strong arguments
that liability for the failure to disclose rests with the doctor only
because to hold otherwise would necessarily require the company
representative to exercise medical judgment regarding what
information should be told to the patient.
II.

LIABILITY BASED ON THE ALLEGED ACTIONS OR
OMISSIONS OF THE COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE.

In addition to claims based on invasion of privacy, a few courts
around the country have considered the analogous issue of whether
("Just as there is a limit to the amount of information physicians can be expected to
digest and explain, there is likewise a limit to what patients can absorb, particularly in
what are often trying and emotional circumstances. The last thing the patient needs is
irrelevant and potentially misleading information."); American Med. Ass'n, Code of
Med Ethics § 8.08 (2004-2005 ed.) (providing that physicians should not disclose
information to a patient when "disclosure poses such a serious psychological threat of
detriment to the patient as to be medically contraindicated").
30 See Tobias v. Winkler, 156 Ill. App. 3d 886, 895-96 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987) (noting
that hospitals, in "limited circumstances," may have a duty to ensure that physicians
who use their facilities secure patients' informed consent, but hospitals cannot have a
duty to mandate what physicians actually tell patients because "it is within the
doctor's discretion to determine what to disclose to a patient in a particular
situation"); Salandy v. Bryk, 864 N.Y.S.2d 46, 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) ("[I]t is the
duty of the physician, not the hospital, to obtain the patient's informed consent.").

2009]
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liability can attach to a medical device or pharmaceutical company for
the actions or omissions of the company representative who is either
present in the operating room or otherwise has knowledge of the
doctor's use of the company's product. Generally speaking, these cases
fall into two categories: (1) where the plaintiff alleges that the medical
device or pharmaceutical company had a duty to prevent the doctor
from using its product either through conduct or warnings; and (2)
allegations of the unauthorized practice of medicine. Not surprisingly,
these cases, in one degree or another, address the same interrelated
legal principles, namely, issues of medical judgment, interference in the
physician-patient relationship, the learned intermediary doctrine,
voluntary undertaking and compliance with federal regulatory
requirements.
A.

No Duty to Prevent
Company's Product.

Physician

Misuse

of

a

The Fifth Circuit was one of the first courts to address the issue
of whether a pharmaceutical company has a duty to affirmatively
prevent a doctor's misuse of the company's products. In Swayze v.
McNeil Labs., Inc. ,31 the plaintiff was the mother of a boy who died as
a result of an overdose of the defendant's anesthetic. Contrary to the
manufacturer's instructions, a registered nurse anesthetist ("RNA"),
rather than the surgeon or anesthesiologist, determined the patient's
dosage and administered the anesthetic. The plaintiff alleged, and the
facts revealed, a state wide practice of RNAs administering anesthetics
without physician supervision.
The plaintiff further alleged that
because of the frequency with which its representatives either observed
surgeries or communicated with doctors, the defendant knew or should
have known of this statewide practice and therefore had a duty to
prevent the misuse. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that because of its
knowledge of the misuse, the manufacturer had a duty to (1) warn the
patients directly of the risk of misuse; (2) take additional steps to
enforce the requirement that only a physician administer the anesthetic;
or (3) withdraw the anesthetic from the market altogether. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.
The court concluded that under the learned intermediary
32
doctrine, the manufacturer had no duty to warn the patient directly.
" 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987).
32 Id. at 471.
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The court stressed that the doctor-patient relationship imposes upon the
doctor, not the manufacturer, the responsibility for ensuring the
propriety of the patient's medical care; and if the physician fails to
fulfill his or her obligations under that relationship - for example by
failing to supervise the RNAs working under his or her supervision the physician is liable. 33 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise
would interfere with the physician-patient relationship:
When the physician-patient relationship does exist, as
here, we hesitate to encourage, must less require, a drug
manufacturer to intervene in it. [The physician] took
responsibility for [the patient's] care, both during the
operation and for some time afterwards. A special
relationship, between physician and patient, thus
formed; this relationship receives special protection in
law, and, at the same time, creates a great responsibility
for every physician. In this case, this relationship
encompassed much more than the dosage of anesthetic
[the patient] would receive. Although in retrospect this
decision, or failure of decision, dwarfed all others, it was
an integral part of [the physician's] responsibility to [the
patient]. He assumed the role of "learned intermediary,"
and the burdens thereof. The facts of this case may
reveal a practice in Mississippi of physicians allowing
[RNAs] too much discretion in a role they are not
trained to play; but it is the physicians who have
undertaken the responsibility of supervising [RNAs],
be shunted onto, or shared
and that responsibility cannot
34
with, drug manufacturers.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs contention that the
manufacturer should have taken steps to enforce its warnings. The
court reasoned that "[i]t is both impractical and unrealistic to expect
drug manufacturers to police individual operating rooms to determine
which physicians adequately supervise their surgical teams., 35 Finally,
the court rejected the plaintiff s contention that the manufacturer should
have removed the anesthetic from the market because "[t]he problem
here lies with individual physicians" not the drug itself, and the

33

id.

34 id.
35

1d.
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manufacturer cannot "control the individual practices
of the medical
36

community, even if it is the prevailing practice...
37
Similarly, the 2003 case of Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P.
also dealt with whether a pharmaceutical company had an affirmative
duty to stop a physician from misusing its drugs. The facts, however,
are far more egregious than Swayze. The plaintiffs son died from an
overdose of narcotics prescribed by the physician, and the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant knew the physician was prescribing narcotics
in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. The facts revealed that
the defendant's sales representative was aware that: (1) the physician
had been over-prescribing the narcotic; (2) some of the physician's
employees were also patients; (3) local pharmacies had complained to
the representative about the excessive prescriptions written by the
physician; (4) the physician was prescribing the narcotic for himself,
and (5) the physician would see up to 48 patients a day from all over
south Florida, many waiting 3-4 hours to obtain a prescription for the
narcotic. As a result, the representative informed her supervisors about
her concerns that the physician was inappropriately prescribing the
narcotic.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently sold and
distributed the narcotic to the physician because it had an affirmative
duty to curtail the inappropriate prescriptions to reduce the potential for
abuse of its product. The court rejected the plaintiffs contentions and
granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
court concluded that the physician's duties to "inform himself of the
qualities and characteristics" of the products he prescribes to his
patients and "to exercise an independent judgment" based on his
knowledge of the patient's medical condition and the drug cannot be
shifted to the manufacturer. 3 8 The court reasoned that a manufacturer
simply cannot have a duty to "interfere with the physician-patient

361d.

at 472. The court's decision prompted a dissent that focused on the
manufacturer's knowledge of the misuse and argued that if the manufacturer knows
the drug is being administrated by an RNA the learned intermediary doctrine does not

apply because there is no learned intermediary between the patient and manufacturer.
However, the dissent would arguably contravene the vast majority of law in this field
because it argued generally for the complete "reversal" of the learned intermediary
doctrine as well as the existence of a "moral" duty to warn the patient directly. Id. at
474 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
37 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
38 Id. at 1354.
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relationship, even if [the manufacturer
is] aware that the product may
39
inappropriately.
have been prescribed
The Illinois Appellate Court followed this same logic and
reasoning in the context of a medical device in the 2006 decision in
Kennedy v. Medtronic.40 In Kennedy, the decedent was the victim of a
cardiac surgeon who placed a pacemaker lead into the wrong side of
the patient's heart. Because the surgeon was retired and had given up
his hospital surgical privileges, the surgery was performed in his office
under local anesthesia with a dentist observing the decedent's vital
signs. The Medtronic representative provided the pacemaker and leads,
attended the surgery, and during the surgery, checked the leads to be
sure they were properly calibrated - i.e. that once placed into the
patient's heart, the leads were able to properly detect and regulate the

heart's electrical pace.
Eventually, a subsequent doctor discovered the retired surgeon
had improperly inserted the lead. The decedent underwent another
procedure to remove and replace the improperly implanted lead, but
died shortly thereafter. His daughter sued Medtronic claiming "that
Medtronic owed [the deceased] a duty to refrain from providing a
pacemaker ...
, and
participating in the [surgery], once [the
representative] discovered the procedure was being performed in a

setting that was not part of a hospital with adequate qualified personnel,
and which lacked proper [medical equipment]." '4 In the alternative, the
plaintiff alleged that under section 324A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, by sending a representative to the surgery, Medtronic had
voluntarily assumed a duty of care for the decedent.
The court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for
Medtronic. First, the court ruled that in simple negligence, no duty of
care existed for two reasons: 1) plaintiff's injuries were not reasonably
foreseeable to Medtronic because the surgeon admitted to violating the
applicable standard of care and Illinois law does not impose a duty to
anticipate the negligence of third-parties; 42 and 2) the burden and
Id. at 1355. See also Buckner v. Allergan Pharm., Inc., 400 So.2d 820, 823-24 (Fla.
App. Ct. 1981) (holding that because a physician's duty of disclosure to a patient "is a
matter of medical judgment," a drug manufacturer cannot have a duty to wam patients
directly even if the manufacturer knows the physician did not inform the patient of
specific product risks).
40 851 N.E. 2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).

39

41 Id. at

785.

see also Ward v. K Mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 152 (1990) ("[A] party need not
anticipate the negligence of others."). Consistent with well-established Illinois law,
42 Id.;
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consequences of imposing a duty on Medtronic would be "substantial"
because it would require Medtronic to interfere in the doctor-patient
relationship:
We also find the burden and consequences of imposing
the duty proposed by plaintiff to be substantial. It
would be a significant burden to require Medtronic to
monitor the conditions under which a doctor performs
Moreover, a central aspect of the learned
surgery ....
intermediary doctrine, as first adopted by our supreme
court in Kirk, is that a licensed physician, such as Dr.
Salvador, has the knowledge of his patient's medical
history and background, and, therefore, he is in a better
position, utilizing his medical judgment, to determine a
patient's needs and what medical care should be
provided. It would be unreasonable, and potentially
harmful, to require a clinical specialist such as
[Medtronic's] to delay or prevent a medical procedure
simply because she believes the setting is not
appropriate or the doctor is unqualified. To hold
otherwise would place a medical device manufacturer,
such as Medtronic, in the middle of the doctor-patient
relationship.4 3
Second, the court ruled Medtronic's representative, by
providing the pacemaker and leads and attending the surgery, had not
voluntarily undertaken a duty under 324A to do anything more than her
clearly defined role of insuring the leads were properly calibrated.
that
Because there was no contention that the representative performed
44
exist.
not
did
324A
section
under
liability
negligently,
role
The Swayze, Labzda and Kennedy decisions make clear that
liability for a doctor's misuse of the company's products cannot extend
to the company itself. Whether a doctor's use of a drug or medical
device constitutes a "misuse" is dependent upon the medical standard
of care. It is not a matter of judgment for a lay company representative.
These cases further make clear that whether a particular medical
procedure is within the standard of care requires an evaluation of the
patient's medical condition of which the company has no knowledge
the Kennedy court concluded that the patient's injuries were not reasonably
foreseeable.
43 Kennedy, 851 N.E. 2d at 786.
44 Id. at 786-87.
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45
and, under modem privacy laws, is prohibited from knowing.
Finally, these cases make clear that a pharmaceutical or medical device
company cannot have a duty to supervise a doctor's use of the
company's products or otherwise prevent a doctor's use of those
products because to do so would require the company to interfere in the
doctor-patient relationship and exercise medical judgment, all of which
the manufacturer is prohibited from doing. In other words, these
decisions support the argument that whether the "use" of a device rises
to the level of a "misuse" is a matter of medical judgment, committed
to the sound discretion of doctors.
For example, many off-label uses of medical devices (the use of
a medical device to treat a condition other than a condition for which it
is intended) could arguably be considered a misuse.46 Under the federal
"practice of medicine doctrine," however, a licensed physician may use
an FDA approved device for any procedure or treatment that the
physician deems is in the patient's best interest:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner
to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to
a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate
health care practitioner-patient relationship.47

The logical extension of any duty to prevent physician misuse,
therefore, would require the medical device company to warn a patient,
and to refuse to sell a device, if a surgeon's contemplated use of the
See also, e.g., Paulsen v. Illinois Dep't of Prof 1 Regulation, 739 N.E.2d 536, 542
(3d Dist. 2000) ("Whether a particular medical procedure is within the standard of
care cannot be determined in a vacuum. Rather, such a determination can only be
made with reference to the individual patient's condition at the time the procedure is
performed.").
46 For example, in McCleary v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., et al., the
45

plaintiff alleged that the medical device manufacturer was liable for allowing or
otherwise not preventing the physician from using a medical device in a manner that
was contrary to the manufacturer's written instructions and warnings. See, e.g.,
McCleary v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.,, No. 01 L 11121 (Cir. Ct. DuPage
County, Ill. [DATE] 2006).
4' 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006); see also John J. Smith, Physician Modification of Legally
Marketed Medical Devices: Regulatory Implications Under the FederalFood, Drug,
& Cosmetic Act, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 251 (2000) ("As applied to medical
devices, the [practice of medicine] doctrine implies that a licensed physician may use
any legally marketed device for any indication that he or she feels is appropriate, even
if that indication is not approved specifically for that product (commonly known as
'off-label' use).").

2009]

COMPANY REPRESENTA TIVES

device is contraindicated, i.e., "off-label." However, under the federal
practice of medicine doctrine, a manufacturer who limits a physician's
use of a device in such a manner "threatens to impinge upon a
physician's discretion in determining the manner in which medical
be used from a medical, as opposed to a regulatory,
devices are to
48
perspective."
Moreover, medical device or pharmaceutical companies have
strong arguments that they have no duty to provide warnings directly to
the patient. The physician's duty of disclosure within the context of the
physician-patient relationship (see supra) serves as a basis of the
learned intermediary doctrine. 49 Under the doctrine, a medical device
or pharmaceutical company has no duty to warn a patient directly of
Rather, a
any dangers inherent in the use of a device or drug.
manufacturer's duty to warn extends only to the prescribing physician,
who, in turn, as a "learned intermediary" exercising both professional
judgment and discretion, conveys relevant and pertinent warnings to
the patient. 5 1 The learned intermediary doctrine, as its nomenclature
suggests, is based on the notion that a physician is learned and
48

Baker v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., No. 95-58737, 1999 WL 811334, at *12

n.33 (Tex. Dist. June 7, 1999).

See AYH Holdings, Inc. v. Avreco, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 1111, 1130 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 2005) ("[T]he learned intermediary doctrine is a special rule created based on
the doctor-patient relationship, where the doctor is in the best position to warn the
patient."); Spensieri v. Lasky, 723 N.E.2d 544, 549 (N.Y. 1999) ("The learned
intermediary doctrine focuses on the scope of a drug manufacturer's duty to warn of
the dangers of using the drug in question. That duty is fulfilled by giving adequate
warning to the prescribing physician. The physician must then balance the risks and
benefits of various drugs and treatments and act as an 'informed intermediary'
between manufacturer and patient.") (citations omitted); Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 462 (Tex. App. 2000) ("According to [the learned intermediary]
doctrine, the manufacturer of a prescription drug has a duty to adequately warn the
prescribing physician of the drug's dangers. The physician, relying on his medical
training, experience, and knowledge of the individual patient, then chooses the type
and quantity of drug to be prescribed.") (emphasis added).
50 See Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Ill. 1987);
Black v. Merck & Co., No. CV 03-8730 NM (AJWx), 2004 WL 5392660, at *4 n.5
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2004) ("Under the 'learned intermediary' doctrine, a drug
manufacturer has no duty to warn the ultimate consumer, the patient, so long as
adequate warnings are given to the doctor.") (citations omitted); Cooley v. CarterWallace Inc., 102 A.D.2d 302, 211 (N.Y. App. Div. (1984) ("The drug manufacturer
has a duty to warn the prescribing physician, not the consumer-patient.").
" Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 395; Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 723 N.E.2d 302, 311
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999), aff'd, 198 Ill. 2d 420 (Ill. 2002); Spensieri, 723 N.E.2d at 549;
Morgan, 30 S.W.3d at 462.
49
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knowledgeable in areas about which the patient will know little. 52 This
same disparity in knowledge forms the basis of the physician's duty of
disclosure in the context of the physician-patient relationship.5 3 It is for
this reason that the Illinois Supreme Court has determined that patients
should look to their physicians
to provide relevant warnings about
54
prescription drugs and devices.
Thus, when a plaintiff alleges that a medical device or
pharmaceutical company should provide warnings directly to the
plaintiff, whether those warnings are related to the product itself or how
the doctor intends to use the product, medical device and
pharmaceutical companies have strong arguments that they can never
have a duty to warn a patient directly. Obviously, the learned
intermediary doctrine would preclude the imposition of a duty to
provide product-specific warnings, but more importantly, the policy
considerations underlying the doctrine, namely the physician-patient
relationship, would prohibit a manufacturer from providing any
warnings to the patient. As discussed above, to hold otherwise would
place the manufacturer in the middle of the physician-patient
relationship.

52

See Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 392; Union Carbide Corp. v. Kavanaugh, 879 So.2d 42, 44

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("A learned intermediary is defined as one who has
knowledge of the danger and whose position vis-a-vis the manufacturer and
consumer, confers a duty to convey the requisite warnings to the consumer.")
(quotations omitted). Bean v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 965 S.W.2d 656, 663 (Tex.
App. 1998) ("In general, the physicians dispensing prescription medicine and
inserting the implant better understand their dangers and propensities. Further

. .

. the

physicians must use [their] comprehensive training and experience in conjunction
with [their] knowledge of the individualized patient in determining the suitability of
the medication.") (citations and quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
53 See, e.g., Goldberg, 471 N.E.2d at 537. ("We also believe that the physicianpatient relationship does create an affirmative duty to disclose facts. Such a
relationship is based upon the theory that the "physician is learned, skilled and
experienced in subjects of vital importance to the patient but about which the patient
knows little or nothing."); Union Carbide,879 So.2d at 44; Bean, 965 S.W.2d at 663.
54 See Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Ill. 1992) ("In our
opinion, consumers should principally look to their prescribing physician to convey
the appropriate warnings regarding drugs, and it is the prescribing physician's duty to
convey these warnings to patients.") (citing Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 524); Humble Sand &
Gravel, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 170, 190-91 (Tex. 2004) ("The rationale for this 'learned
intermediary' rule is not that a direct warning from manufacturers to patients is
infeasible, in the practical, physical sense of that word, but that it is betterfor the
patientfor the warning to come from his or her physician.")(emphasis added).

COMPANY REPRESENTA TIVES

2009]

B.

A Company Can be Liable for its Representative's
Actions, Including the Unauthorized Practice of
Medicine.

While medical device and pharmaceutical companies can
generally avoid liability arising out of their alleged omissions (i.e., their
failure to prevent physician misuse of their products), liability can
attach for their actions, either under section 324A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts or because the actions amount to the unauthorized
practice of medicine.
Liability Under Section 324A of the
Restatement.
As noted above, the plaintiff in Kennedy alleged that by
providing a representative to attend the surgery, Medtronic had
voluntary assumed a duty of care for the patient.55 Section 324A
provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration,
to render services to another which he should recognize
as necessary for the protection of a third person or his
things, is subject to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect his undertakings, if (a) his failure to exercise
reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, (b) he
has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to
the third person or (c) the harm is suffered because of
reliance of the other or the third person upon the
undertaking.
1.

Obviously, liability can attach for the representative's negligent
performance of his or her duties.
For example, in Chamian v. Sharplan Lasers, Inc.,56 the
plaintiff suffered significant facial scarring and loss of skin
pigmentation from the misuse of a laser during cosmetic surgery. The
manufacturer of the laser did not have an employee present during the
surgery; rather, the manufacturer sold the device to a third-party
distributor that leased the laser to the physician and itself provided a
55

Kennedy, 851 N.E. 2d at 786.

56

Chamian v. Sharplan Lasers, Inc., No. 20000171, 2004 WL 2341569, at *7 (Mass.

Super. Sept. 24, 2004).
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technician to assist the physician during the surgery. In addition to the
physician, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer and the distributor.
The laser at issue had various settings that controlled the
strength of the beam and the duration of the actual pulse. In addition to
warning against the risks of misuse, the manufacturer provided
instructions and recommended settings based on the procedure the
physician intended to perform. The appropriateness of the settings
depended upon both the procedure to be performed and the patient's
physical and medical condition, but ultimately the physician had to
decide what settings were appropriate. The manufacturer also provided
training to the physician and the distributor's technician. Although his
job required him to program the laser as directed by the physician, the
technician was also permitted to answer the physician's questions and
reiterate the recommended settings as specified in the instructions.
Prior to the plaintiffs procedure, the physician informed the technician
what procedure he was going to perform and asked the technician to
program the recommended settings. The technician, based on his prior
experiences, programmed the laser for settings that were not
recommended for the plaintiffs procedure. As a result, the laser
burned the plaintiff's face.
As against the manufacturer, the plaintiff alleged: (1) the
warnings were inadequate because the manufacturer "watered them
down" by stating that the final decision as to the settings to be used was
the physician's to make; and (2) the manufacturer negligently trained
the physician and technician. The court rejected the plaintiffs
allegations, and granted the manufacturer's motion for summary
judgment. The court reasoned that under the learned intermediary and
sophisticated user doctrines the manufacturer had fulfilled its duty to
warn. In so holding, the court stressed that "it was the physician's
responsibility to exercise his clinical judgment to determine the
appropriate settings based on the characteristics of the patient's skin
and the objectives of the surgery." 57 The court also rejected the
plaintiffs "negligent training" theories against the manufacturer,
holding that "the fact that individuals who have received training on
medical equipment subsequently misuse the equipment ."... standing
alone, is insufficient...8 The court emphasized that "by providing
training, [the manufacturer] did not become a guarantor of the
",59
competence of either [the physician or the technician].
57 Id.
58 id.

59 id.
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The court, however, denied the distributor's motion for
summary judgment.
The court reasoned that "by [providing a
technician to assist in the surgery, the distributor] assumed a duty to...
ensure that the [representative] was knowledgeable about the
equipment and competent to provide technical assistance to
physicians." 60 In so holding, the court rejected the distributor's
argument that the physician's negligence broke the proximate cause
chain, stating that "the fact that [the physician] had the responsibility to
exercise his clinical judgment to determine appropriate settings and was
required by the standard of care to confirm that the settings [were
appropriate] does not preclude negligence on the part [of the
technician] from being a substantial contributing cause of [the
injuries]., 6 1 The court stressed that regardless of the physician's
conduct, the distributor had a duty to "provide a trained and competent
62
technician.
2.

Liability for the Unauthorized Practice of
Medicine.

A more nebulous issue is the notion of liability for the
unauthorized practice of medicine. Most, if not all, states have a
medical practices act. For example, the Illinois Medical Practice Act of
1987" prohibits the "practice [of] medicine, or any of its branches, or
[the] treat[ment] [of] human ailments without the use of drugs and
without operative surgery, without a valid, existing license to do so.64
However, "[t]he legislature did not define 'the practice of medicine' in
the definition section of the Medical Practices Act [and] [a] flexible
definition of the practice of medicine is required in a statute intended to
govern various healers from osteopaths to herb doctors." 6 5 New York
defines the practice of medicine as "diagnosing, treating, operating or
prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or physical
condition." 66 Florida and Texas have definitions similar to New

60

id. at *8.

Id.
Id.
63 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/1 - 63 (2008).
64 225 ILL COMP. STAT. 60/3 (2008).
65 Siddiqui v. Illinois Dep't of Prof 1 Regulation, 718 N.E.2d 217, 224 (Ill. App. Ct.
61

62

1999) (citations omitted, alterations added).
§ 6521 (McKinney 2008).

66 N.Y. EDUC. LAW
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York.67 While the question of whether an activity amounts to the
practice of medicine is highly fact-dependent, 68 the case law makes
clear that determinations and decisions "requiring the exercise of
medical judgment" can only be made by a licensed physician:
Each and every medical problem requiring the exercise
of medical judgment varies in complexity and severity,
but what all cases have in common is "an individual
human being," a patient who has an illness or condition,
whose treatment must be evaluated by one with the
compassion, the authority and medical training, and the
intimate knowledge of the patient's problem and needs
(including the patient's physical and psychological
to make the treatment decision:
[condition]), required
69
physician.
the
Thus, medical device manufacturer representatives are precluded from
doing anything that would involve the exercise of medical judgment.

67 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 458.305(3) (2008) ("Diagnosis, treatment, operation, or
prescription for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or other physical or
mental condition."); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 151.002(a)(13) (Vernon 2008)
("Diagnosis, treatment, or offer to treat a mental or physical disease or disorder or a
physical deformity or injury by any system or method, or the attempt to effect cures
of those conditions, by a person who: (A) publicly professes to be a physician or
surgeon; or (B) directly or indirectly charges money or other compensation for those
services.").
68 People v. Rubin, 424 N.Y.S.2d 592 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Queens Co. 1979) (discussing
the many issues to determine whether an activity is the practice of medicine).
69 State of Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Serv. v. Bowen, 797 F. 2d 391, 412
(7th Cir. 1986) (italics in original); see also Jackson v. Chicago Classic Janitorial &
Cleaning Serv., Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d 906, 912-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005)
(concluding that determinations requiring the exercise of medical judgment "can only
be properly made by individuals with the necessary training and expertise."); NCO
Financial v. Komurka, No. E042232, (Super. Ct. Nos. RIC416929, RIC 420515),
2008 WL 541604, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2008) ("The decision to obtain
additional medical consults for a patient in the Emergency Department is a medical
decision which can be made only by the licensed physician, as such a decision
involves medicaljudgment.") (emphasis added); Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v.
Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 850 (Tex. 2005) ("The nature and intensity of care and
treatment, including professional supervision, monitoring, assessment, quantities and
types of medication, and other medical treatment are judgments made by
professionals trained and experienced in treating and caring for patients and the
patient populations in their health care facilities.").
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To do so could subject themselves to either, civil penalties, criminal
penalties or both.7°
At one end of the spectrum lies People v. Smithtown General
Hospital.1 Smithtown involved a hip replacement surgery. The
physician enlisted the help of the general sales manager of the
prosthetic hip manufacturer. 72 During the surgery, the physician
encountered a problem with the prosthetic hip. At that point, the sales73
manager scrubbed in to remedy the problem and finish the surgery.
The surgery lasted approximately three and a half hours, during which
period the physician walked away from the operating table. 74 The court
found that the physician "abdicated his role as surgeon in that operating
room and permitted the judgment and skills of a layman to prevail,"
that the salesman's "involvement in the surgical procedure extended far
beyond instruction as to the use or manner of implant of the device he
sold," and that "the Grand Jury could conclude that the salesman...
unlawfully engaged in the practice of medicine without the prior
consent of the
patient under circumstances which did not constitute an
75
emergency.,

At the other end of the spectrum lies the Texas Appellate
Court's decision in Disbrow v. Richards,Inc.76 that also involved a hip
replacement surgery. The plaintiff in Disbrow sued the manufacturer
of a prosthetic hip and the manufacturer's representative who provided
the hip and surgical supplies to the surgeon when a tool supplied by the
representative broke during the surgery. The plaintiff alleged that the
representative - who was present in the operating room but did not
scrub in and merely provided the device and surgical tools used to
implant the device - was liable for the unauthorized practice of
medicine. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, and concluded that the representative's
See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/3.5 (2008) (providing civil penalties for the
unlicensed practice of medicine); Id. at 60/59 (providing criminal penalties for the
unlicensed practice of medicine); See also Kohn v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 347 II1.
App. 3d 746, 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) ("A violation of a statute designed for the
protection of human life or public safety is prima facie evidence of negligence and
creates a cause of action if the violation has a direct and proximate connection with
the injury.").
71 New York v. Smithtown Gen. Hosp., 93 Misc. 2d 736 (Suffolk Co. 1978).
70

72

Id.at 738-39.

73 Id. at

74 Id.

739-40.

75 Id.at 740.
76

Disbrow v. Richards, Inc., No. 14-95-00759-CV, 1996 WL 593780 (Tex. App. Oct.
17, 1996).
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participation in the surgery did not amount to the unauthorized practice
of medicine because the representative was not involved in "diagnosis
or treatment., 77 Rather, the representative merely "assisted the scrub
in order - a service that is offered by most
nurse get equipment
' 78
manufacturers. "
Somewhere in the middle lies Hurley v. Heart Physicians,
P.C.79 In Hurley, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether a medical device manufacturer could be liable for the
statements made by a representative. The plaintiff was born with a
congenital heart condition requiring the use of a pacemaker. When she
was fourteen, the battery of the pacemaker she had at that time needed
to be replaced. According to the pacemaker's FDA-approved manual,
"[t]he physician should schedule an immediate replacement of the
pacemaker" when the battery needs to be replaced. 80 According to both
the doctor and the company representative, however, the plaintiffs
mother did not want her daughter to go through yet another surgery and
would not agree to the surgery.
As a result of the physician's and representative's belief that the
mother would not consent to the surgery, the physician asked the
representative if there were options for extending the life of the battery.
The pacemaker's manual provided that the pacemaker's rate could be
reduced to a rate of 40 beats per minute, and the representative testified
that reducing the rate would extend the battery's life. The pacemaker
manual provided, however, that "[r]ates less than 40 ppm are intended
primarily for diagnostic purposes." 8' The physician decided to make
the rate reduction to evaluate "[the plaintiffs] ability to function with
the pacemaker operating at a lower rate,",82 prolong battery life, and
obtain additional information to convince the mother that a replacement
surgery was required.83 Shortly after the downward adjustment was
made, the plaintiff suffered a sudden cardiac arrest that caused
permanent brain damage. 84
The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the manufacturer. In so doing, the court agreed with the
defendant that under the learned intermediary doctrine, the
" Id. at *2.
78

id.

79 Hurley v. Heart Physicians, 898 A.2d 777 (Conn. 2006).
80

Id. at 780-81.

81Id. at
82 Id. at
83 id.
84 id.

782 n.7.
778.
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manufacturer had no duty to provide warnings directly to the plaintiff.85
The court further agreed that if the representative "did nothing
inconsistent with the manual," then summary judgment would be
appropriate because the plaintiffs claims would be preempted.86 The
court stressed that in such a situation, a representative who merely
recites to the doctor the information set forth in the FDA-approved
The court
manual cannot subject a manufacturer to liability.
concluded, however, that there was a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the representative's statement that the pacemaker's rate could
be turned down in the circumstances presented was actually consistent
that the pacemaker's rate can be turned
with the manual's statement 87
purposes.
diagnostic
down for
Although dicta, the court also discussed in detail the legal
principles that weigh against the imposition of a duty upon a device
manufacture to prevent physician malpractice. As the court concluded,
whether and how to use a device to treat a patient are matters of
medical judgment. 8 Thus, "the learned intermediary doctrine . . .
applies independent of whether the manufacturer knew or should have
known of the physician's inferior care because '[w]hen the physicianpatient relationship does exist ..

.

we hesitate to encourage, much less

require, a drug manufacturer to intervene in it."' 89 Indeed, the logical
extension of the Hurley opinion makes clear that, as the courts similarly
made clear in Disbrow and Chamian, if what the representative told the
physician in Hurley is not consistent with the FDA-approved warnings
and instructions, the plaintiff would have a strong argument that the
representative actually engaged in the unauthorized practice of
medicine and that the representative negligently fulfilled his duties.
Disbow, Chamiam and Hurley make clear that a company
cannot be held liable for the unauthorized practice of medicine merely
because its representative is present in the operating/treatment room.
Rather, the representative must participate in the actual treatment of the
patient and/or the exercise of medical judgment. Thus, representatives
should be advised that they should not, under any circumstances,
exercise any modicum of medical judgment. In addition, as Hurley
" Id.
at 786.
86

Id. (italics omitted).

Id. at 788.
Id. at 786 ("[Plhysicians, as learned intermediaries, still 'stand in the best position
to evaluate a patient's needs and assess [the] risks and benefits of a particular course
of treatment."').
89
17

88

Id.(quoting Swayze).
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makes abundantly clear, a representative should never provide
information other than what is set forth in the FDA-approved manual, if
any.
CONCLUSION
Advancements in technology and the medical sciences have
lead to an unprecedented growth in the number and use of medical
devices and drugs to treat patients. These devices and drugs extend and
improve the lives of millions of patients every year, and therefore, are
immeasurably valuable to society. Their complexity, however, also
places an increasing burden on pharmaceutical and medical device
companies. Physicians are experts in the practice of medicine. They
cannot possibly be expected to be an expert in the workings of the
innumerable devices and drugs currently on the market, particularly
with new drugs and devices entering the market every year. As a
result, doctors are increasingly dependent on company representatives
who are such experts. Because of the advances in technology and
medial sciences, this dependency can only be expected to increase.
Thus, medical device and pharmaceutical companies should be aware
of the liability that can attach because of a physician's reliance on
company representatives and instruct their representatives accordingly.

